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1 Introduction
Economists, almost habitually, seek to explain economic phenomena by assuming that the
economic actors are motivated by self-interest. Experimental economics scrutinizes this
approach and offers findings that sometimes contradict the assumption of rational self-
seeking behavior, and sometimes support it.1 Experimental economics provides, thus, a new
battleground for the struggle between defenders of orthodoxy and heretics.
It remains uncertain, however, whether experimental economics will lead eventually to a
better understanding of economic phenomena. The accumulation of experimental and empiri-
cal findings will not suffice, as illustrated by the fate of the historical school of economics. A
hundred years ago, these economists collected extensive and often very interesting material,
hoping that this would lead to a new theory – but, as Ronald Coase noted, they were mistaken:
“Without a theory they had nothing to pass on except a mass of descriptive material waiting
for a theory, or a fire”.2 In a hundred years’ time the same may be said of the experimental
economists unless they succeed in providing a theoretical frame for their findings.
Simply assailing orthodox assumptions for lack of realism elaborates the obvious. It is
well-known that the usual behavioural assumptions employed in economics are unrealistic.
The very economists who analyze economic phenomena in such a way know that. They
canvass homo economicus rather than homo sapiens. Assuming self-interested behaviour for
analyzing economic phenomena is used as a theoretical tool. It is not meant to be a realistic
behavioural assumption and is, therefore, not invalidated by any experimental refutation of
such behavior.
The justifications for postulating self-seeking behaviour in economics are detached from
the issue of realism. The assumption is typically defended by arguments of a quite different
nature. Sections 3 to 7 provide a short survey of the most important defenses of the homo
The German original of this article appeared as “Der Homo Oeconomicus unter experimentellem Beschuß” in
Experimente in der Ökonomik. Jahrbuch 2: Normative und institutionelle Grundfragen der Ökonomik, edited
by Martin Held, Gisela Kubon-Gilke, and Richard Sturn, vol. 2, Marburg: Metropolis 2003, pp. 291-313
(https://epub.ub.uni-muenchen.de/70965/) and has been translated by the author who is professor emeritus of
economics at the University of Munich, Germany, E-mail: schlicht@lmu.de. He thanks Gerlinde Schäfer-
Schlicht for a number of critical remarks.
1 See for example Goeree and Holt (2001) and Brown et al. (2002).
2 Coase (1984, 230).
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economicus assumption. The subsequent sections discuss how experimental economics may,
in view of these defenses, contribute to a positive understanding of economic phenomena.
2 Justifications for homo economicus
For non-economists it is often difficult to apprehend why economists emphasize the self-
ishness motive so much. Isn’t it obvious that action is induced by the most diverse motives,
often jointly, and that it seems implausible to assume one single motive underlying all eco-
nomic behaviour? People act out of gratitude, anger, social commitment and for many, many
other reasons. These motives may be declared as “self-serving”, because people prefer to be
induced by these, rather than other motives, but such a parlance amounts to a misleading
game with words. If an action is motivated by thankfulness, the action has the well-being of
the giver as its goal, or the balancing of benefits received and benefits given, but not that of
the actor. It is not self-serving. Similar objections could be raised against depicting anger,
revenge, or many other motives, as arising from selfishness.
There are several reasons why economists nevertheless consider selfishness as the preem-
inent motive. I would like to discuss three important justifications:
• homo economicus as a useful approximation
• homo economicus as ideal type
• homo economicus as an as-if -construct
The following three sections briefly sketch these justifications and explain why they are
only marginally affected by possible experimental findings. I will then radicalise the evo-
lutional point of view that underlies the as if defence of homo economicus and urge that
the psychological processes of norm formation need to be analyzed both theoretically and
experimentally.
3 Homo economicus as a useful approximation
It is sometimes maintained that self-interest is of particular importance for understanding
economic behaviour and that other motives are less important. Accordingly, the homo eco-
nomicus can be seen as a useful approximation that allows us to understand the essential and
dominant regularities in economic life.3 This idea offers an important support for starting
with the assumption of self-interested behaviour. At the same time, however, it must also be
conceded that actual behaviour is often not based on self-interest. The approximation can
therefore only be useful for certain problems. One of the leading economists of the German
historical school, Gustav Schmoller (1883,243), has phrased this criticism as follows:
Certain isolations may be absolutely wrong. The chemist may dare to ignore physical
properties of a chemical object, but if he examined the atmospheric air and said
according to the principle of Mengers’ isolation: “I only consider nitrogen because it
prevails”, he would be thrown out of the laboratory immediately.
If studies about price formation were initially based on self-interest as a seemingly
fixed factor, this was appropriate for explaining the simplest market processes; how-
ever, it is wrong to make this a rule for all future research and the study of all
complicated economic processes. In any case and as far as this is done, it must
3 See, for example, Roth (1996).
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always be kept in mind that, on the basis of hypotheses, you only obtain hypothetical
sentences.
Schmoller points out that the selfishness motive is important but is not the only one driving
human action, and that it is not clear under which conditions we may neglect the other
motives and still obtain an approximate picture of the processes of interest.
If, in some cases, the motive of self-interest can explain certain experimental results
and all other motives can be neglected, while, in other cases, systematically misguided
predictions resault, this would confirm Schmoller’s scepticism, as the thesis that the self-
interest assumption sometimes leads to approximately correct conclusions and sometimes
not, is not particularly helpful. The conditions under which the approximation works must
be spelled out. Experimental economics can be useful here – but only if it is based on
the development of general criteria, rather than showing in a case-by-case way that the
approximation sometimes works and sometimes doesn’t.4
4 Homo economicus as an ideal type
Carl Menger (1841-1921), probably the most outspoken defender of homo economicus,
acknowledged that human motivation cannot be reduced self-interest, yet he defended homo
economicus vehemently as a theoretical assumption. He believed that it was the task of
economics to “make us aware of the laws holding for an analytically or abstractly conceived
economic world” (Menger, 1986, 72f.). The economist’s task is to construct an image of
an economy characterized by purely self-serving behavior. Its purpose is to outline an ideal
type of an economy. The connection with actual economic phenomena ought to be discussed
separately.
Menger criticized the “realistic” conception of economics which he attributed to Schmoller.
His main objection was that that empirically realistic studies could only provide more or less
disjointed facts:
The scientific knowledge to which the above orientation of theoretical research,
the empirical-realistic, can lead, merely in consideration of the methodological
presuppositions of the latter, can only be of two kinds: (a) real types, basic forms
of real phenomena, within the typical image of which, however, a more or less
broad scope is given for particularities (also for the development of the phenomena!),
and (b) empirical laws, theoretical knowledge, which make us aware of the actual
regularities (though they are by no means guaranteed to be without exception) in
the succession and coexistence of real phenomena. . . . The realistic orientation
of theoretical research excludes in principle, rather, in all realms of the world of
phenomena the possibility of arriving at strict (exact) theoretical knowledge.5
Only “theoretical” economics which assumes selfishness as the sole motive of economic
action, can lead to a science of economics. Realistic assumptions and historical findings will
4 Kliemt (2001) is much more critical of the selfishness assumption. He points out that among homines
economici, no legal order could prevail, and thus no economic order, and that an economic analysis based
on the homo economicus assumption is therefore self-contradictory. Whenever we observe something that
appears to be compatible with the usual rationality assumptions, this observation would need to be explained,
but would not provide any explanation itself.
5 Menger (1986, 57-58). John Stuart Mill (1909, 242) has already noted this in a similar but perhaps more
meaningful way: “. . . only through the principle of competition has political economy any pretension to the
character of a science.”
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not serve that purpose. In the words of Menger’s student Max Weber (1864-1920), research
starting with the homo economicus seeks to construct an ideal type that serves as a reference
point for empirical observations. This leaves no room for realistic objections. Rather, reality
must be understood as a deviation from the ideal type.6 Singular deviations are of little
significance. Rather the fit of the overall conception to reality is central.
Experimental findings cannot challenge an ideal type. If some “paradoxa” – in the sense of
deviations from self-interested rational behaviour – are showing up in some experiments, this
shows only that the ideal type is not fitting in all cases, yet does establish inappropriateness
of the ideal type as a mental reconstruction of reality. An ideal type can only be dethroned
by another “better” ideal type. Empirical research cannot do that. Or in the words of Carl
Menger (1986, 70):
To want to try out the pure theory of economics on experience in its full reality is
a process similar to that of a mathematician who wanted to correct the principles
of geometry by measuring real objects, without considering that these latter are not
identical to the quantities which the pure geometry supposes.
An ideal type is coherent in itself, completely independent of any experience – think of
Pythagoras’ theorem – immune to any empirical or experimental criticism. Thus, an ideal
type cannot be “wrong”, but only irrelevant. It remains useful as long as it contributes to the
understanding of economic phenomena. Doubts may arise, however, when the number of
cases multiply where actual behavior contradicts the traditional assumption of rational self-
seeking behaviour. The accumulation of such deviations can weaken the persuasive power
of the ideal type, just like a permanent canonade may eventually make a fortess crumble. If
experimental economics weakens rather than strengthens the homo economicus assumption,
it it may work like such a permanent canonade. But the question remains: which new ideal
type should replace the old one?
5 Homo economicus as an as-if-construct
However, the self-interest assumption can not only be defended as offering a useful approxi-
mation or an ideal type – it can be justified in a much more fundamental way. Based on the
biological theory of evolution, this view has found its classical economic formulation by
Armen Alchian (1950). He maintains that the results of competition between economic actors,
rather than their actual motives, can be understood by assuming profit maximization and the
search for individual advantage. The self-interest assumption is a theoretical construction
that summarizes the final outcome of various selection and adjustment processes, rather
than the actual processes themselves. Just like the processes of natural selection in biology
describes the results of natural selection without spelling out the genetic mechanisms that
govern propagation and variation, the self-interest assumption can help to understand the
formation of economic regularities and institutional structureswhile bypassing the manifold
motives of economic behaviour.
Alchian has outlined his position as follows:
6 Weber (1972, 3). Elwell (1996) aptly describes the concept of the ideal type as follows: “An ideal type
provides the basic method for historical-comparative study. It is not meant to refer to the ’best’ or to some
moral ideal. . . . . An ideal type is an analytical construct that serves as a measuring rod for social observers to
determine the extent to which concrete social institutions are similar and how they differ from some defined
measure.”
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A modification of economic analysis to incorporate incomplete information and
uncertain foresight as axioms is suggested here. This approach dispenses with “profit
maximization”; and it does not rely on the predictable, individual behavior that is
usually assumed, as a first approximation, in standard textbook treatments. Despite
these changes, the analytical concepts usually associated with such behavior are
retained because they are not dependent upon such motivation or foresight. The
suggested approach embodies the principles of biological evolution and natural
selection by interpreting the economic system as an adoptive mechanism which
chooses among exploratory actions generated by the adaptive pursuit of “success” or
“profits.” The resulting analysis is applicable to actions usually regarded as aberrations
from standard economic behavior as well as to behavior covered by the customary
analysis.7
This defense of the homo economicus has a long tradition in economics. Karl Marx (1909,
iii.x.61) writes, for example:
Hence Capital is reckless of the health or length of life of the labourer, unless under
compulsion from society. . . . But looking at things as a whole, all this does not,
indeed, depend on the good or ill will of the individual capitalist. Free competition
brings out the inherent laws of capitalist production, in the shape of external coercive
laws having power over every individual capitalist.
Marx thus sees the accumulation of capital as largely detached from the individual behavioral
inclinations of the capitalists. Interestingly Alfred Marshall (1842-1924), who emphasized
the importance of standards and conventions for economic behaviour and was convinced
that the self-interest assumption did not adequately grasp human motivation, held a similar
view. He thought that the formation of behavioral norms and conventions was shaped by
self-interested behaviour and wrote:
I believe that very many economic customs could be traced, if we had only knowledge
enough, to the slow equilibration of measurable motives: that even in such a country
as India no custom retains its hold long after the relative positions of the motives of
demand and supply have so changed that the values which would bring them into
stable equilibrium, are far removed from those which the custom sanctions.8
Marshall sees the creation of economic customs as being driven by the search for advantage.
In this sense, his considerations can be read as justifying the assumption of self-interest as
an “as if” concept. People largely follow customary ways of behavior, but these customary
ways are continually shaded by variations driven by the search for advantage. Successful
behaviours, customs and norms will eventually prevail in the course of social evolution. These
can be interpreted “as if” households and firms are acting out of self-interest.9
7 Alchian (1950,211). Milton Friedman (1953,3-43) argued with a similar background that the closeness
of the assumptions to reality was not decisive for economic theories because of the a-top view. Gary Becker
(1962,1) is even more radical when he points out that many analytical results can remain valid even with
completely irrational behavior. In my opinion, however, this is a somewhat problematic position, since it
amounts to the assumption that homo economicus is always justified if it leads to correct analytical results, but
not otherwise. This cannot be contradicted, but such a thesis does not say much, as long as a criterion is not
given that states under which conditions self-interest assumption sufficies as an approximate explanation.
8 Marshall (1885, 169-70).
9 In Schlicht (1998, Ch. 5) I call this view “adaptive custom”. The theory on the formation of norms,
motives and behaviours presented there modifies this point of view.
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6 The erosion argument10
To evaluate the arguments by Marx, Marshall, and Alchian, we consider a normatively
guided behaviour, which has been confirmed experimentally many times, but stands in
blatant contradiction to the kind of selfish behaviour that we usually assume. The erosion
argument, which I will explain in time, amouts to the thesis that such behaviour, which
contradicts self-interest, cannot be sustained in the long run. Rather, we must expect changes
in behavioral routines to occur until behaviors emerge that can be understood as brought
about by self-interested behaviour of the individuals.
We consider a “dictator game”: two persons, 𝐴 and 𝐵, are asked to agree on dividing a
sum of money among them. The first person 𝐴 – the dictator – receives the money, keeps as
much of it as she wants for herself and leaves the rest to the other person. Person 𝐴 would
of course keep nearly everything to herself if she behaved as a selfish homo economicus.
Person 𝐵 would accept any positive amount that 𝐴 would offer her as a bribe, because without
agreement both 𝐴 and 𝐵 would receive nothing, and any positive amount is better than that.
In experimental situations, however, both behaviors do not occur. A will typically give a
significant portion of the amount of money to 𝐵, and 𝐵 will typically refuse to accept a share
from 𝐴 if it is too small.
This behaviour is obviously related to the fairness perceptions of the players. These vary
considerably across cultures. The shares offered by the dictator and accepted by the receiver
average at 44% in industrial societies and vary between 26% and 58% in the non-industrial
societies examined by Henrich et al. (2001, 74).
The question then is how these ideas of fairness are formed. Various observations and
experiments show that people base their fairness judgements on what is usual.11 Different
norms emerge in different societies according to differences in what is usual. In corporatist
societies, the completely different legal positions of nobility, citizens and serfs were perceived
as fair, as was discrimination against women, simply because the corresponding distinctions
were common. They were normal and therefore became the norm. If, as a different case,
we consider the benefits that are paid to employees in modern companies in excess of the
collectively agreed pay, they are perceived as normal after a relatively short period of time.
They become part of the collective agreement, also legally, in spite of being offered as an
extra. It has been shown experimentally that crass discrimination is perceived by both the
privileged and the disadvantaged as completely fair under appropriate conditions. 12
Regading the dictator game, we can describe the dictator’s behaviour as follows. Denote
by 𝑥 the share that dictator 𝐴 keeps for himself. The amount (1− 𝑥) that remains fo the other
person 𝐵 if both agree on 𝑥. To formalize the observed behavior described above, we assume
that the dictator does not take everything, because she is aware of a fairness standard 𝑓 that
describes the fair share, and she tries to behave in a way that is not perceived as unfair. If the
fairness standard is 𝑓 = 1/2, for example, this means that the equal distribution is perceived as
fair. If 𝑓 = 3/4, this means that it is considered fair if the dictator assigns 3/4 to herself and 1/4
to the other player 𝐵.
10 The following erosion argument is essentially due to Alfred Marshall. In recent literature, it has been
advanced by Romer (1984) against Akerlof’s (1976) theory of caste societies, see also my own critique of
Akerlof’s (1982) ’Gift-Exchange’ theory (Schlicht, 1990, 164, n. 11) and the development of the argument
in Schlicht (1998, Ch. 5). The defence of Nash equilibria in evolutionary game theory can be seen as a
formalization of the erosion argument, see Mailath (1998). The formal representation chosen here follows
Schlicht (1993, 185-6).
11 Kahneman et al. (1986, 731-32).
12 Major and Testa (1989), Austin and Hatfield (1980, 80).
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The dictator has two goals: She wants to have as much as possible for herself by proposing
a share 𝑥 as large as possible, but she also wants to behave fairly such that the proposal is
acceptable by choosing a division 𝑥 that is as fair as possible and as close to 𝑓 as possible.
The deviation from the fair distribution – the unfairness of the proposal – is given by
function 𝑑 measuring the difference between 𝑓 and 𝑥

















This expresses that the deviation of the fair distribution increases with the difference
between the proposed division 𝑥 from the fair division 𝑓 .
The benefit 𝑢 of the “dictator” can now be described by a function of the proportion 𝑥
and the unfairness 𝑑:




The dictator selects her proposal 𝑥 such as to maximize her benefit 𝑢 (𝑥, 𝑑 ( 𝑓 − 𝑥)). as big as




that must be fulfilled. Since the benefit increases with increasing proportion 𝑥 (𝑢𝑥 > 0) and
decreases with increasing injustice (𝑢𝑑 < 0), it follows that
𝑥 > 𝑓 .
The dictator will therefore always claim a share of 𝑥 for herself which is slightly higher
than the fair share 𝑓 ! She will, so to speak, always round a little in her favour. A small
deviation of 𝑥 from 𝑓 is still “almost just”, but brings pay-off benefits that exceed the costs
aising from a little less fairness.13 We also find this behaviour confirmed in the aforementioned
dictator games, in which the proposers typically deviate a little from the fair distribution in
their own favour.
If we now look at such a process of division, which is constantly repeating itself and
taking place between different partners (which is typical of economic processes), then the
people who propose a division will usually claim a greater than their fair share. This will be
perceived as normal over time. The fairness standard 𝑓 will adapt; it will now appear fair if
the dictator claims a larger part of it. (A justification could be that in the case of changing
roles, the lower payout in the role of the recipient could be justified by the higher share in
the role of the dictator, and vice versa – also again typical of economic processes.) With a
rising fairness standard 𝑓 , the claimed part 𝑥 will also increase. Ultimately, the divider will
claim everything (or nearly everything) for himself and this will appear to be fair. We will
therefore achieve approximately the same result that we would have predicted by assuming
strictly selfish behaviour right away!
Thus the homo economicus assumption does not rule out that people are motivsated by
norms and custom; rather the homo eeconomicus can be used to explain actual behaviour
including the adaptation of norms.
13 Technically speaking: Any deviation of 𝑥 = 𝑓 brings an additional first-order benefit and additional
second-order “fairness costs”.
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7 Experiments in the light of the erosion argument
In view of the erosion argument, many experiments related to fairness and reciprocity must be
viewed with a certain amount of scepticism. If deviations from selfish behavior are actually
driven by norms, this cannot be seen as an objection to the theoretical usefulness of the homo
economicus that simply “short-circuits” norm adjustments.
It could be objected that, first of all, the learning effects postulated in the erosion argument
are often not to be observed in experiments, secondly, that standards can be maintained in
some theoretical models which contradict a strict self-interest assumption and, thirdly, that
many phenomena in reality speak against an unexceptional validity of the erosion argument.
As far as the experiments in which there appears to be no erosion of standards are
concerned, this objection is countered by the fact that the absence of erosion is presumably
an artefact of the experimental situation.14 In the experiment, many facts that occur in reality
and which can serve as justification for discriminatory behaviour, for example, are ignored.
In synthetic experiments, such natural points of contact for self-interested rationalizations
are not as abundant as they are in reality. In reality, we must therefore expect standards to be
eroded even if we do not find such erosion in the experiment.
As far as theoretical models are concerned, in which there seems to be no erosion of
standards, exogenous parameters are always postulated here in preferences which themselves
are not subject to evolution. Then, of course, erosion cannot take effect. However, the
maintenance of norms in these models is then caused by modelling, which excludes norm
erosion and therefore cannot explain the absence of erosion.15
There are many phenomena, e. g. the payment of tips, which do not seem to be eroded
by standards. Ultimately, psychological factors must be at work that influence the formation
of standards in a non-adaptive way. These psychological dispositions form the basis of my
theory of norm formation (Schlicht, 1998).
The erosion argument depends decisively on the assumed unstructured plasticity of the
formation of standards. If standards are derived from reality but are not simply adaptive, the
erosion argument is less convincing. Then not everything would be possible normatively,
the normative structures would be subject to their own semantics, which canalizes possible
adaptations. In my opinion, experimental economics should concentrate on these “active”
psychological tendencies and on phenomena in which a development can be observed that
runs counter to the erosion argument - i. e. away from the strictly selfish result.16 The fact that
standards play a role is clear and proven by the experimental results. What is now lacking is
a positive theory of the formation of norms, which gives up the assumption of a full plasticity
of normative structures.
In fact, the assumption of such plasticity is probably incorrect. The same must be treated
equally and similarly. Ultimately, the categorisation processes behind the formation of classes
of comparable cases are thus a decisive factor in the formation of standards, claims and
conventions. However, these categorization processes are not arbitrarily flexible. Otherwise
they might not work at all (Schlicht, 1998, Ch. 7). However, as soon as one takes into
consideration such peculiarities of normative structures, their independent formative power
14 Fehr et al. (1996).
15 See e. g. Güth and Kliemt (2003) or Fehr and Schmidt (1999). The evolutionary game theory, which aims
at the benefit-driven learning of behavioural patterns, can be seen as a formal representation of the erosion
argument. The defence of Nash equilibria in evolutionary game theory is essentially based on this idea, see
Mailath (1998).
16 The fact that the formation of norms has a certain autonomy is already evident in the classic dictator game
by Güth (1984), see also the comments on these findings in Schlicht (1984, 68-70).
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cannot simply be neglected in theory. Much speaks in favour of this viewpoint, especially the
persistence of practices in different cultures that are disadvantageous to the individuals who
practice them. 17
Many everyday phenomena appear from this perspective in a new light. Previous efforts,
which from an orthodox point of view represent irrelevant sunken costs, determine negotiation
results in a significant and systematic way (Gächter and Riedl, 2005). Since such prvious
efforts are aspects of economic processes, they cannot be taken as exogenously given when
explaining for these processes. This is especially true because people do not only orientate
their behaviour towards certain goals, but also take into account that their behaviour at the
same time justifies future claims and negotiation results. 18 When taking this into account, the
behaviour evades a simple orthodox interpretation in terms of selfishness, but is not irrational.
8 Evolution, experiments and institutions
Economic theories are never meant literally. The evolutionay argument maintains that we learn
from experience, are aided by complicated psychological processes. This shapes behaviour.
Companies and individuals experiment incessantly. They copy successful behaviors and
abandon less successful strategies. Consumers make their purchasing decisions by using
decision routines that have been adopted in this manner, and companies opt for strategies that
appear promising. Ultimately, the entailed behavior can be described in terms of biological
fitness maximization. The fitness functions are our utility functions; rational behaviour
maximizes profit and utility.19 In this way, the evolutionary argument links the ideal-typical
homo economicus to reality. The benefit maximization hypothesis offers a concise and
conclusive formula for the final result of such processes, but in no way describes psychological
reality. Therefore, a criticism based on actual cognitions and decision-making processes is
not appropriate.
This position suggests that the irrationalities and behavioural “anomalies” that manifest
themselves in experiments are less important for economic behaviour than it may seem at
first glance. In this respect, the laboratory experiments exaggerate the deviations of actual
behaviour from the theoretical picture.
This view is supported by a number of recent contributions which show that simple
heuristics induce quite often much more successful behaviour than conscious optimization
(Gigerenzer et al., 2000). In this respect, the systematic “irrationalities” revealed in experi-
ments serve, so to speak, for better optimization. Considerations in evolutionary psychology
on the one hand and relevance theory on the other go in a similar direction.20
From these considerations, one could again draw the conclusion that realistic criticism of
homo economicus, as it is held sometimes to be implied by experimental work, misses the
point. However, I do not think that is the case.
17 In connection with the economics of religion, it is the “meaning constraint” that prevents certain adjust-
ments, as would be expected from the point of view of the erosion argument (Schlicht, 1995).
18 In other words, the principle of isolation would be violated if standards were to be considered as exogenous
conditions Schlicht (1977, Ch. 1).
19 The above argument is theoretically not entirely clean, because “fit rules need not be rational, and rational
rules not be fit”, as Blume and Easley (1998, 9) state from a theoretical point of view; for our purposes,
however, this more differentiated view is not taken here.
20 Concerning evolutionary psychology, see Barkow et al. (1992) and Ortmann and Gigerenzer (1997), for
criticism from the point of view of relevance theory, see Sperber et al. (1995). Both views point to functional
advantages of seemingly irrational behaviour. The difference refers to the fact that Tooby and Cosmides see
cognitions as area-specific, whereas Sperber et al. argue that cognitions are not.
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The evolutionary defense of the homo economicus is in fact double-edged, if not mis-
leading, since it says that people actually think and behave differently than theoretically
postulated and that the theoretical forecasts are true only regarding the result, but not in the
assumed causality, and only if an adequate institutional environment exists. If it is said that
the dispositions of people’s behaviour work well and appropriately in everyday life, while
they often do not appear to make sense in experimental situations, this simply means that
human dispositions of behaviour can lead to very different results depending on the situation.
The institutions in which people act influence human actions and the results of human actions
directly.
Thus, if one takes up the idea of evolution, one is led to the thesis that some institutions
assert themselves in institutional competition while others perish, but the success of institu-
tions in institutional competition depends on how they use and channel human behavioral
dispositions. If we look at the economic process as an institutional process, the real human
dispositions of behaviour become important because they are the material on which our
institutions are based. It is therefore not surprising that only those institutions that manage
human behaviour in the right way survive, and that irrationalities are practically not so impor-
tant because they have brought about institutions that protect us from these irrationalities.21
However, this is not an unproblematic defence of the orthodox viewpoint. According to this
argument, the institutions have adapted to people’s psychological dispositions, and not the
other way round, as implied by the orthodox view of self-interest. In this respect, causality is
seen in reverse.
From an orthodox point of view, institutions do not exist at all as intrinsic influencing
factors, since there are only individuals and perhaps contractual networks between them.
Furthermore, from an orthodox point of view, arbitrary alternative forms of organization are
equivalent as long as they only implement the same incentives. 22 In the model of general
equilibrium, for example, there is no difference between a capitalist economy and a self-
governing economy or competitive socialism. All we have to do is interpret the indices of
the model in a suitable way, and the same model will describe one or the other case. From
an orthodox point of view, a capitalist entrepreneur will offer his managers and his workers
the same incentive systems as a collective of workers in a self-governed enterprise,and
so on – simply out of self-interest. Regarding important institutional questions, the homo
eeconomicus-oriented theory is blind and therefore not very meaningful. It is not entirely
wrong, but does not say much. It illuminates some aspects, leaves others in the dark and
portrays some observations in a misleading way.
To address institutional issues, we need to include psychological factors in the explanation.
However, these factors must not be chosen arbitrarily. As has been shown in connection
with the erosion argument, adaptive norms do not explain anything except perhaps inertia in
adaption. On the other hand, arbitrarily adopted standards explain everything. If we really
want to go beyond the self-interested approach, we have to explicitly consider the processes
that generate norms, claims and counterclaims. It is to be hoped that experimental economics
will be oriented in this direction. If experimental economics turns in this direction, important
impulses for further theoretical developments can be expected.
21 Frey and Eichenberger (1989), Frey and Eichenberger (1994), Zajac et al. (1991), Zajac (1995).
22 See e. g. Cheung (1969).
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